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Abstract: Technological strategic alliance (TSA) formation represents an important 
competitive mechanism for firms, and it can be considered as a real option on future 
technological opportunities. Our objective is to analyse, under a real options reasoning, 
how firms decide between forming TSAs or adopting alternatives one-step technology 
strategies. Using a panel of 29376 observations from 4050 manufacturing firms operating 
in Spain - covering the 1998-2005 period -, we find that the greater the firm’s absorptive 
capacity and the greater the degree of technological risk, the more likely is the firm to 
form a TSA rather than adopting other technology strategies. Our results also show that 
the greater the risk of pre-emption by rivals and the greater the opportunity costs 
associated with TSA formation, the less likely is the firm to form a TSA.  
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Firms are resorting increasingly to interfirm collaboration to deal with the 
current complex environment, characterized, among others, by markets 
globalization and continuous technological change. Academic interest in 
strategic alliances has also been arisen, proliferating the number of theoretical 
and empirical papers on the topic, specially from the 80’s. In this regard, two 
broad streams can be recognized (Aulakh and Madhok, 2002): the first stream 
focuses on the motives behind alliance formation, and the second one is based 
on the governance of the collaboration process. This paper is primary concerned 
with the formation research stream. Specifically, we focus on the formation of 
technological strategic alliances (henceforth TSAs). 
Given the current strategic importance of learning, TSAs constitute an important 
source of competitive advantage (Garcia-Canal, Valdes-Llaneza and Sanchez-
Lorda, 2008), as this kind of collaboration is more often oriented towards inter-
organizational learning than those that do not have technological scope 
(Colombo, 2003). We define a TSA as a formalized long-term agreement 
between two o more organizations, which engage in interdependent value chain 
activities, such as R&D activities, to transfer existing technological capabilities 
from one partner to another and/or to generate jointly new ones (Khanna, Gulati 
and Nohria, 1998; Feller, Parhankangas and Smeds, 2006; Lavie, 2007; Lavie, 
Lechner and Singh, 2007; Faems, Janssens, Madhok and Van Looy, 2008). 
TSAs are one of the possible strategies that firms can adopt to acquire 
technological capabilities, thus, to capture value from technology (Inkpen, 
2005). But firms can also resort to alternative technology strategies like 
acquisition of other firms, which have already the pursued technological 
capabilities, or also arm’s length transactions. One of the main differences 
between these technology strategies and TSAs is the nature of the embedded 
investment process. While both acquisitions and arm’s length transactions 
represent one-step or full investment strategies, TSA formation represents a 
sequential or incremental investment strategy. Hence, TSAs provides the firm 
with the option to access to certain technological capabilities, acting as a 
platform to capture future technological opportunities while avoiding full 
resources commitment, i.e. maintaining flexibility.  
The central question that emerges and motives our research is: How do firms 
decide between forming TSAs or adopting alternatives one-step technology 
strategies? To answer this question, explicit valuation of the value generated by 
TSA formation –relative to the value generated by other alternatives strategies- 
is needed. In line with this, our objective is to extend the current state of 
understanding into TSA formation by using the real options approach 
(henceforth ROA). We do not deny the worth of the insights offer by other 
approaches, but we emphasize the usefulness of the ROA, for several reasons. 
First, the concept of value creation offered by ROA is particularly suitable, 
through superior reflection of the technological opportunities as value drivers 
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(Kester, 1984; Myers, 1984; Pape and Schmidt-Tank, 2004). According to the 
ROA, the value created by any investment can be broken into the cash flows 
stemming from the assets-in-place and those stemming from future opportunities 
(Myers, 1984). Concerning TSAs, we identify as the main source of value the 
ability of the partners to earn sustained rents and, specially, to capture future 
strategic opportunities from their technological capabilities, (Madhok, 2004). 
Secondly, the ROA literature has specifically addressed the differences between 
incremental and one-step investment strategies, as well as having pointed out the 
advantages of the first ones under uncertainty. Thus, the ROA not only can be 
considered as a valuation mechanism for the TSA formation, but also it offers 
valuable theoretical arguments, recognizing the importance of the trade-off 
between commitment and flexibility in decision-making.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we explain TSA formation 
under the real options reasoning. Next, we present our valuation model and 
develop our theoretical hypotheses. The subsequent sections are devoted to the 
presentation of the methodological issues, the empirical findings, and their 
implications for research. The paper concludes by pointing out our main 
contributions and limitations, as well as some directions for further empirical 
work. 
2. Putting TSA formation into a real options reasoning  
The question of why firms engage in interfirm collaboration has been broadly 
addressed from different theoretical frameworks. Scholars researching alliance 
formation have been particularly inspired by transactions cost theory 
(Williamson, 1975) and the resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
The first theory suggests that firms should engage in TSAs (hybrid forms), 
instead of resorting to pure market or hierarchy, when collaboration represents 
the form that minimizes the transaction costs associated with the development of 
technological capabilities (Kogut, 1988; Hill, 1990; Dyer, 1997; Hennart and 
Reddy, 1997; Barney, 1999; Madhok, 2000; Madhok, 2004). On the other hand, 
the resource-based view claims that TSAs allow firms to create more value than 
what could have been created through either market transaction or acquisitions, 
due to the synergies that arise when two bundles of complementary 
technological capabilities are properly combined (Teece, 1986; Kogut, 1988; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Barney and Hesterly, 1999; Barney, 1999; 
Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle and Borza, 2000). 
ROA goes beyond transaction costs and synergies and offers new useful insights 
into the issue, by considering TSAs as real options and recognizing the 
interdependences associated with strategic decisions (Miller and Folta, 2002). 
As Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) stress “a real option is the investment in 
physical assets, human competence, and organizational capabilities that provide 
the opportunity to respond to future contingent events” (p. 745). In his 
pioneering work, Kogut (1991) considers that joint ventures “are created as real 
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options to expand in response to future technological and market developments” 
(p.19) and, in this regard, he suggests that investments in joint ventures “serve as 
platforms” (p. 32). In line with this, Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) establish that 
platform investments, like joint ventures, represent investing in opportunity and, 
thus, should be recognized as real options. More recently, many works inspired 
by the ROA (Folta, 1998; Folta and Miller, 2002; Colombo, 2003; McGrath and 
Nerkar, 2004; Pape and Schmidt-Tank, 2004; Vassolo, Anand and Folta, 2004; 
Savva and Scholtes, 2005) have drown the analogy between the strategic 
alliance and an American call option1. The outcome of a TSA is a portfolio of 
technological capabilities previously unavailable, which provides its owners 
(TSA partners) the right (but not the obligation) to invest in future opportunities. 
In other words, TSAs represent compound real options- i.e. real options that 
involve complex series of nested investments or represent multistage 
investments. In particular, we consider that forming a TSA provides two linked 
options: the option to defer full commitment to the technology that underlies the 
TSA, and the growth option to capture future technological opportunities. When 
a firm forms a TSA it gains the access to a growth option for future 
technological expansion, while retaining the option to defer full commitment to 
this technology (Vassolo et al., 2004; Fisch, 2006). Thereby, ROA proposes to 
consider the trade-off between commitment and flexibility in evaluating the 
convenience of TSAs versus one-step technology strategies. 
Delaying the decision of full commitment- waiting for more information- 
represents a source of flexibility for firms, which has value insofar as the 
investment is irreversible and risky (Mcdonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1995). This source of flexibility arises from the incremental nature of 
the TSA investment process. Once the opportunity to form a TSA is recognised 
and the firm decides to engage in the collaboration process, it could delay full 
commitment to the underlying technology. Thus, the firm may preserve 
flexibility by waiting for more information from the environment, about whether 
it is convenient to capture effectively future opportunities upon larger 
commitment or not. This incremental nature can be represent by the following 
four-step option chain regarding TSA formation (Hurry, Miller and Bowman, 
1992; Bowman and Hurry, 1993), as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Step 1. Recognition of the shadow option: Shadow options represent latent 
opportunities for firms. In this case, the firm’s base of contacts and prior 
interfirm ties may create the latent opportunity to form TSAs. However, this 
opportunity come into being only once the firm recognises it. 
                                                 
1A call option conveys the right, but not the obligation, on the holder to buy and underlying 
asset (a stock, a stock index, a commodity future) at a given price and at some point in the 
future. Unlike European options, American call options can be exercised anytime during its 
life. 
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Step 2. Acquisition of the option: As in the case of financial options, the cost 
of acquiring a call option on technology (through TSA formation) is small, 
relative to the cost of directly purchasing the technology. In this step, the firm’s 
objective is to guarantee the access for certain technological capabilities at some 
point in the future, while keeping only a small amount of resources at risk, thus, 
putting the foot at the door.  
 
Figure 1. The option chain for TSA formation 
 
Step 3. Waiting for information: During this exploratory period, the firm holds 
this option ‘open’, waiting for a signal from the environment which allows it to 
decide. In other words, upon this holding period, the firm has exercised the 
middle option to defer full commitment to the underlying technology. Enjoying 
this period to evaluate the technology for the larger investment in next step, 
thus, deferring full commitment, allows the firm to maintain flexibility2.  
Step 4. Option exercise/abandon: If a positive signal arises from the 
environment, the firm will exercise its final call option on technology upon a 
larger investment. Thereby, the firm will commit fully to the underlying 
technology in order to capture technological opportunities. On the contrary, if 
the signals emerged from the environment seem to discourage the full 
                                                 
2 However, as we explain in the third section, there may be some factors (e.g. the risk of pre-
emption by rivals), which may lead to make early full commitments. 
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commitment, the firm will abandon its option, thus, ruling out the capture of 
these opportunities. 
Whatever the result of step 4 is, as a consequence of its involvement in the TSA, 
the firm has acquired shared experiences with the partner and other business 
contacts, and it has attained a new bundle of capabilities in this regard. Thus, the 
firm has formed the background for, among others, engaging in new interfirm 
collaborative process (i.e. for new shadow options).  
3. Model and Hypothesis 
The firm’s decision between forming a TSA or adopting an alternative one-step 
technology strategy, need to be based on the explicit valuation of each strategy. 
Thus, it is required to analyse if the ability of the partners to earn sustained 
economic rents and, specially, to capture value from future strategic 
opportunities, is greater than what could have been attained in the absence of 
technological collaboration- i.e. if the firm had engaged in alternative one-step 
technology strategies. In this regard, ROA “offers a perspective from which to 
develop ideas that are relevant to the problems facing decision-makers in 
established firms” (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004: 19). 
Thus, to deal with this valuation task, we resort to the analogy between TSAs 
and American call options. This analogy allows us to identify some explanatory 
variables from the option pricing theory (OPT)3, which are pertinent to value 
TSA formation. OPT models (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) suggest 
the following variables affecting the value of a call option: the underlying asset 
value (S), the exercise price (X), the asset price volatility (σ), the option life (T), 
the risk-free interest rate (r), and the dividends ( δ ).  
Accordingly, the value of a call option is given by the following expression 
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However, to offer a more comprehensive valuation model on TSA formation, it 
may be convenient to adapt the OPT variables for the particular case of TSA 
formation. Thus, in Table 1, we explain briefly the analogy between the 
variables affecting the call value (financial option) and the variables we consider 
specifically affect to the value of TSA formation (as a real option).  
 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed application of the option-based valuation techniques see Myers (1977), 




Table 1. Analogy between the variables affecting call and TSA formation 
values 
Call TSA Formation 
S Underlying asset value Underlying technology value: Represents the technology/capabilities that 
the firm want to have access in future through the TSA formation. 
Underlying technological capabilities are likely to be more valuable as the 
future opportunities they allow to capture are greater.  
 
X Exercise price Expenditures in terms of organizational an economic resources, needed to 
capture effectively future technological opportunities, thus, to make full 
commitment. 
 
σ Price asset volatility Underlying technology risk: The extent in which the environment is likely to 
take a sudden turn regarding the underlying technology, making it become 
obsolete. 
 
T Option life Underlying technology expiration: The period of time during which the 
decision of commit fully to the underlying technology may be deferred.  
 
δ Dividends Opportunity costs represent a loss of value in terms of cash flows or 
learning opportunities, coming from having adopted TSA instead of other 
one-step technology strategies. 
 
 
All these variables proposed by OPT can be easily identified and quantified for a 
call on a financial asset. Concerning real options, however, these variables 
represent abstract and intangible concepts, thus, are difficult to determine. For 
instance, it is easy to identify the period which represents the life of an 
American call option but for a TSA there may be not an explicit expiration date 
for capturing future opportunities (not even if partners agree in advance an 
expiration date for their collaboration). Another example is represented by the 
intangible nature of the technological capabilities that form the underlying 
technology value of a TSA. Thereby, despite the clear relationship between the 
OPT variables and the relative value of TSA formation, we face such a problem 
of ‘inobservability’. As McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow (2004) stress “In the 
field of management, however, application of real options theory is 
preparadigmatic. Scholars have not yet been freed from the need constantly to 
re-examine its first principles”. In the same thread of thought, Kogut and 
Kulatilaka (2004) point out that “In contradiction to the idea of ‘domain 
extension’, we propose a ‘translation’. […] A good domain translation 
understands not only the original language and the targeted language but also 
their correspondence […] (p. 103). Thus, in order to propose testable hypotheses 
grounded in ROA and to count on data that can be used to test them, we 
‘translate’ the concepts underlying OPT variables, drawing the correspondences 
between them and other more operative variables, which are unequivocally 





Figure 2. Option-based valuation model for TSA formation. 
 
 
In particular, as Figure 2 shows, we consider the relationship between the firm’s 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and the difference between the 
underlying technology value and the exercise price (S-X); the relationship 
between the exogenous technological risk or environmental technological risk 
(Folta, 1998; Vassolo et. al, 2004; Yin and Shanley, 2008)4 and the underlying 
technology risk (σ); the relationship between the risk of pre-emption by rivals 
and the option life (T); finally, we consider the relationship between the 
opportunity costs and the dividends (δ).  
 
The effects of each one of these observable variables on firms’ propensity for 
TSA formation (relative to the propensity for other one-step strategies) are 
explained in the following sections. 
Absorptive Capacity 
To capture future technological opportunities, firms need to develop in advance 
the needed capabilities. Concerning TSA, such technological capabilities may be 
built through learning about the partner’s existing technology or else co-
developing innovations among partners. In other words, firms need to succeed in 
developing interfirm technological learning to capture future opportunities. 
Following our previous definition of TSA, TSA formation may offer such 
possibility, but it is not a sufficient condition. In explaining that, the theory of 
                                                 
4 Folta (1998) and Vassolo et al. (2004) consider that exogenous technological risk is usually 
specific to the industry and implies that the technological trajectory is not already established 
or it is likely to change, and it is predominantely resolved over time rather than through firm 
actions. In a similar vein, Yin and Shanley proposes that environmental risk refers to the 
clarity or predictability of the technological premises of the industry.They stress that this risk 
“is multidimensional: technologies and products may change, market acceptance of a product 
line may be unclear, and new products may have an impact on future industry operations” 
(2008: 480). We consider both concepts as interchangeable.  
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absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) suggests that a firm’s capacity 
of learning from the TSA is greater when the new technological knowledge to 
be assimilated is related to the firm’s existing technological capabilities (Lane 
and Lubatkin, 1998). Absorptive capacity may be defined as the firm’s dynamic 
capability to acquire, value, assimilate and exploit new technological knowledge 
from the TSA (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Zahra and George, 2002). In this 
regard, it has been pointed out that if firms have complementary knowledge 
bases, their capacity to absorb partners’ technological knowledge from 
collaboration is greater (Colombo, 2003; Sakakibara, 2003) and, thus, mutual 
inter-firm learning is easier to arise (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). The reason stems from the fact that a firm’s absorptive capacity tends to 
develop cumulatively, be path dependent and builds on prior capabilities (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). 
The concept of absorptive capacity allows to draw two implications for the 
firm’s propensity for TSA formation under a real options reasoning. First, the 
greater the firm’s ability to acquire, value, assimilate an exploit the 
technological capabilities that underlie the TSA, the greater these capabilities’ 
value (S) for the firm, due to the firm’s ability to take advantage of future 
opportunities through exploiting the underlying technology as well as the value 
generated by that, are likely to be greater. Secondly, the greater the firm’s 
absorptive capacity, the less the expenditures of organizational resources 
required to make full commitment to the underlying technology (i.e. the lower 
the price for exercising the final TSA option, X).  
In short, absorptive capacity encourages TSA formation rather than other one-
step strategies, by increasing the underlying technology value (S) and 
simultaneously reducing the exercise price (X) for capturing future 
opportunities.  
These ideas are captured in our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1. The greater the firms’ absorptive capacity, the more likely is the 
firm to form a TSA instead of engaging in alternative one-step technology 
strategies. 
Technological Risk 
TSA formation is considered as a platform for taking advantage of technological 
future opportunities (Kogut, 1991; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Kogut and 
Kulatilaka, 2001), and, thus, provides the firm with the right to defer the 
decision of committing to a certain technology until the exercise is optimum. 
Following the OPT insights, we consider that high exogenous technological risk 
(i.e. technological environmental risk) implies the possibility that the basic 
technological assumptions of the TSA may be challenged or rendered obsolete 
(Yin and Shanley, 2008). Thus, the ROA suggest that firms should prefer to 
engage in sequential technology strategies, such as TSAs, when the 
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technological risk is high rather than alternative one-step strategies. What is 
more, through TSA formation, firms not only protect themselves from the 
technological risk, but also may benefit from it (Kogut, 1991). Unlike other 
approaches, the ROA considers specifically the firm’s ability to manage with 
and benefit from technological risk by putting the foot on the door.  
The option to defer full commitments represents a valuable source of flexibility 
(Folta, 1998). That is particularly worth for firms operating in highly risky 
environments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1995). As Yin and Shanley (2008) proposes, 
alliances will be more likely than other alternative strategies, like acquisitions, 
in industries where technological risk is high. In line with this, there is much 
empirical evidence supporting the argument that firms facing with high degree 
of exogenous technological risk are more likely to form TSA rather than those 
firms facing with lower degrees of risk. For instance, Hurry et al., (1992) reveal 
that Japanese firms, unlike American firms, follow real options logic to make 
high-technology investments in the U.S. In a similar vein, McGrath and Nerkar 
(2004) prove that American pharmaceutical firms prefer sequential investment 
R&D strategies to one-step strategies. It has been also empirically found that 
those Spanish firms which belong to industries with high technological risk have 
a greater propensity to establish cooperative R&D agreements (Bayona, Garcia-
Marco and Huerta, 2001). Folta (1998) shows that equity alliances are preferred 
to acquisitions in the U.S. biotechnology industry, due to the less resources 
commitment required. Similarly, Vassolo et al. (2004) show how technological 
risk influences whether firms in that industry exercise their real options.  
On the basis of these arguments relative to the exogenous technological risk (i.e. 
environmental technological risk), which act as the underlying technology risk 
(σ), we propose our second hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2. The greater the exogenous technological risk (i.e. environmental 
technological risk), the more likely is the firm to form a TSA instead of engaging 
in alternative one-step technology strategies. 
The risk of pre-emption by rivals 
While delaying the decision of making full resources commitment to a certain 
technology is valuable in terms of protecting and profiting from the 
technological risk, it may involve the risk of pre-emption by rivals (Trigeorgis, 
1991; Folta, 1998; Miller and Folta, 2002). High levels of this risk may favour 
early strikes of the option or even may foster that firms engage in one-step 
technology strategies rather than TSAs. Thus, in practice, the risk of pre-
emption reduces the available time to postpone the full commitment to the 
underlying technology. (Folta and Miller, 2002)- i.e. reduces the option life (T). 
Forming TSA, instead of engaging in a one-step technology strategy, may 
increase the risk of pre-emption firms have to cope with, due to, unlike financial 
options, the option to take advantage of future technological opportunities is 
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generally not exclusive but collective (Kester, 1984). This option is not 
exclusive for the firm that has engaged in the TSA but it may be available for 
many other firms. As Miller and Folta (2002) point out “strategic alliances may 
produce shared growth options. Technologies generated by the alliance provide 
the bases for future business opportunities” (p.661). It means that the option to 
capture future technological opportunities may be exercised by other rivals 
during this period as well. Thus, the risk of pre-emption stems from the 
possibility that rivals exercise the option pre-emptively. Obviously, firms that 
have made small commitments to a certain technology (e.g. through TSA 
formation) will be better positioned than those that have not made any previous 
commitment, but only supposing that this technology remains dominant. In this 
regard, the option may also be not exclusive in the sense that a rival may attain a 
radical technological innovation and this new technology may be able to 
dominate the market, making the rest of technologies obsolete. In both cases, 
while the degree of protection from technological risk offered by TSA formation 
is high, the degree of protection from the risk of pre-emption by rivals is low, 
relative to that offered by other alternative one-step strategies, specially, 
acquisition (Folta, 1998). Therefore, early investment commitment or even 
following a one-step technology strategy from the beginning may be justified 
when the risk of pre-emption by rivals is high, to avoid losing value (Trigeorgis, 
1991; Miller and Folta, 2002). 
These arguments give rise to the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3. The greater the risk of pre-emption by rivals, the less likely is the 
firm to form a TSA instead of engaging in alternative one-step technology 
strategies. 
Opportunity Costs 
Considering the TSA as a call option allow us to understand how firms may also 
fall into opportunity costs when they engage in TSA formation (Colombo, 2003; 
Folta and Miller, 2002; Miller and Folta, 2002). A holder of an American call 
option on a financial asset, such as a share, which is giving out dividends, does 
not receive such dividend payment unless he/she strikes the option and, thus, 
buys effectively the share. Although the holder has protected himself/herself 
from the share price volatility through the call acquisition, he/she is falling into 
opportunity costs: the dividends. Thus, opportunity costs concerning real options 
act as the dividends (δ) in the financial options case (Merton, 1973; Trigeorgis, 
1991; Miller and Folta, 2002). 
When opportunity costs exist, the TSA formation value is decreased (Miller and 
Folta, 2002), relative to the value of alternative one-step strategies which do not 
involve such costs. In particular, opportunity costs derived from TSA formation 
may take the form of sacrificed cash flows or learning possibilities (Folta and 
Miller, 2002). If the firm engages in a one-step technology strategy like 
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acquisition, it will be able to use the underlying technology immediately and 
that is likely to provide economic rents. These rents or cash flows which the 
firm could have earned by exploiting these technological capabilities represent 
opportunity costs. Regarding learning opportunity costs, for instance, when 
TSAs involve the co-development of a new technology, partners usually 
concentrate a great part of their R&D efforts on it. However, it could be possible 
that the collaborative research activities do not result effectively in innovation. 
Although it may be partially considered as an investment to acquire some 
technological capabilities through interfirm learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), 
it may be considered as a loss of other technological learning opportunities, 
which may exist beyond the TSA.  
Hence, if the firm had invested in other one-step technology strategy like 
acquisition, it would have been able to prevent these types of losses. Thus, the 
existence of opportunity costs discourage TSA formation (Folta and Miller, 
2002; Miller and Folta, 2002), fostering one-step technology strategies. 
We capture this set of opportunity cost-related arguments in our last hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4. The greater the opportunity costs associated with TSA formation, 
the less likely is the firm to form a TSA instead of engaging in alternative one-
step technology strategies. 
4. Methodology, Sample and Variables 
4.1. Sample 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of manufacturing firms with more than 10 
employees operating in Spain. Data comes from the Survey of Entrepreneurial 
Strategies (henceforth ESEE) which has been carried out by the ‘Public 
Enterprise Foundation’ (Fundación SEPI) in collaboration with the Spanish 
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce. The ESEE database’s objective is 
to gather information about firms’ strategies. The sample is stratified by 
industry, province, and firm size to guarantee the reliance of the data, and new 
firms substitute for nonresponding ones within each stratum every year5.  
Moreover, the ESEE database matches our research requests basically for two 
reasons. First, the ESEE was conceived specially to provide an adequate source 
for the implementation of the econometric models, being one of the best Spanish 
data source available for making firm-level estimations (Merino and Rodríguez, 
1997; Delgado, Martín and Jaumandreu, 1999; Alvarez and Molero, 2005; 
López and Martín, 2008). Secondly, the ESEE database provides longitudinal 
information, among others, about the sequential and one-step technology 
strategies followed by firms. In turn, the ESEE allows us to connect over time 
                                                 
5 For broader information about the ESEE database, see www.funep.es/esee. Information 
about publicated papers using this database is available in 
www.funep.es/esee/esee_articulos.asp. 
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such firms’ strategic decisions with a wide range of features of its environment 
(e.g. information about the degree of technological risk or of the thread of pre-
emption by rivals).  
Table 2. Sample’s description. 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
No. of 
Observations 3676 3662 3618 3659 3654 3743 3738 3628 29376 
Total No. of TSAs 168 155 162 137 132 91 101 114 1060 
     Joint Ventures 89 82 87 72 69 50 55 61 565 
Other TSAs  79 73 75 65 63 41 46 53 495 
 
In particular, the panel used in this paper covers the eight-year period from 1998 
to 2005 and is composed of 29376 observations (within the total period), coming 
from 4050 firms. Table 2 provides information on the sample detailed by years. 
In addition to its longitudinal nature, our sample is comparable with those used 
in previous research (e.g. Vassolo et al., 2004; Folta y Miller, 2002; Colombo, 
2003). Moreover, unlike most of prior research, our sample provides 
information from a range of manufacturing industries6. 
4.2. Specification of the econometric model 
In order to test our hypotheses and identify what factors influence firms’ 
propensity to form TSAs instead of engaging in alternative one-step technology 
strategies, we use a binomial logit model, using the data analysis and statistical 
software Stata 9. The dummy dependent variable equals 1 if the firm has 
engaged in a joint venture with technological scope (henceforth, JV), taking null 
value otherwise7. Due to the dichotomous nature of the JV variable, a logit 
analysis is the most suitable method. Moreover, sample has a panel data 
structure because we identify the observations from each individual (firm) at 
every time, and, thereby, fixed effects or specific features of each firm may 
exist. Thus, in fixed-effects logit for panel data, observations are grouped by 
firms, and the likelihood function is calculated for each firm, providing more 
efficient estimations. We test the existence of fixed or random effects by 
conducting the Hausman test, which follows a χ2 distribution, under the null 
hypothesis of lack of systematic differences in coefficients from fixed-effects 
and random-effects estimates. In sum, this is the model to be tested:  
Prob. (TSAit=1) = β0 + β1⋅Absorptive_Capacity + β2⋅Technological_Risk + β3⋅Risk_Preemption + 
β4⋅Opportunity_Costs + β5⋅Firm’s Size + β6⋅Firm’s Age + β7⋅Belonging_Group + 
ηi + εit 
                                                 
6 The ESEE database collects information of firms operating in the 18 Spanish manufacturing 
industries, according to the classification of the National Statistic Institute of Spain (INE). 
The industry list is displayed in the appendix. 
7 In order to guarantee the reliability of the analysis, we consider two exclusive categories of 
firms: those that engage in JV, and those that neither engage in JV nor in any other kind of 
technological collaboration. 
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Where i represents each individual (i.e. each firm) and t represents time; ηi is the 
fixed-effects term for each individual, and εit is the random error for each 
observation). A brief explanation on explanatory and control variables is offered 
below. 
4.3. Variables and Measures 
This section describes the measures we use from the ESEE for the explanatory 
and control variables in the model and, when necessary, which other sources are 
used to construct the variables. The measures we use, whenever it is possible, 
are based on prior empirical research.  
Absorptive Capacity  
Traditionally, the literature has suggested that the firm’s absorptive capacity is 
represented by systematic R&D efforts, both internally developed and externally 
contracted (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Sakakibara, 1993; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Bayona et al., 2001; Zahra and George, 2002; Arbussà and Coenders, 
2007). Accordingly, we measure the firm’s absorptive capacity using, first, the 
ratio total (internal and contracted) amount of R&D expenses to the firm’s 
annual sales- ACAP1. In line with this, we use the annual number of product 
innovations- ACAP2-, as we consider this measure represents the outcomes of 
the firm’s R&D systematic efforts.  
In addition, we use the number of R&D employees /the total number of firm’s 
employees ratio–ACAP3. We consider that the greater the number of R&D 
employees, the greater the firm’s ability to learn and absorb new technological 
knowledge from a TSA.  
All these measures are directly provided by the ESEE. 
Technological risk  
Following prior empirical research (Folta, 1998; Folta and Miller, 2002; Vassolo 
et al. 2004), technological risk is meant to capture the exogenous or 
environmental risk specific to the main industry in which the firm operates. We 
use two different measures for technological risk. First, the recognition of the 
managerial capacity of evaluating the environment is one of the most important 
assumptions from the ROA, that has highly contributed to the ROA be 
considered as superior, compared to traditional project valuation methods- i.e. 
discounted cash flow techniques. (Kester, 1984; Myers, 1984; Trigeorgis and 
Mason, 1987; Kulatilaka and Marcus, 1992; Dixit and Pindyck, 1995; Pape and 
Schmidt-Tank, 2004; De Andrés, Azofra and De La Fuente, 2006). Thus, as Yin 
and Shanley (2008) propose and in line with Bayona et al. (2001), we use a 
dummy variable provided by the ESEE- TECHRISK1-, which equals 1 if the 
firm’s manager has considered technological change is likely to occur and has 
considered the potential use of technologies alternative to the currently one used 
by the firm (zero otherwise).  
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Second, as a more objective measure, we have created a categorical variable- 
TECHRISK2-, using the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
classification for industry technological intensity. TECHRISK2 takes the values 
1, 2, and 3, depending on the degree of the technological intensity of the 
industry (medium, medium-high, and high). 
The risk of pre-emption by rivals  
Regarding the risk of pre-emption by rivals, the value of deferring the option 
exercise is expected to decrease with an increasing number of technological 
rivals. Thus, the risk of pre-emption has usually been measure by the number of 
rivals of the industry (Folta and Miller, 2002; Folta, 1998; McGrath and Nerkar, 
2004). In a similar vein, we measure this risk of pre-emption using a market 
concentration index -PREEMPT1- provided by the ESEE, which adds up the 
market shares of the four main rival firms, as long as there are rivals with 
significant market share (it takes null value otherwise). Additionally, we 
consider the effects of industry lifecycle. In particular, the necessity of 
innovation for firms’ survival (i.e. degree of technological rivalry) increases as 
the industry approaches maturity and, specially, decline stage. Thus, we use a 
related categorical variable from the ESEE- PREEMPT2-, which equals 1 if the 
industry is in its early stages (introduction and growth stages), 2 if the industry 
is in the maturity stage, and 3 if the industry is in the decline stage. 
Opportunity Costs 
As far as we know, opportunity costs have not been measured in prior empirical 
research in a pertinent manner to our study. The reason may stem from the fact 
that many authors consider the risk of pre-emption by rivals as an opportunity 
cost (Folta, 1998; Colombo, 2003; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004), while we 
address the differences between these two variables. We have approximated the 
underlying technology‘s expiration  (T) by the number of rivals, so we choose a 
different measure for opportunity costs, which is related to the cash flows 
generated by the current firm investments. In particular, we use the ratio 
operating income minus investments to assets, as a proxy for those opportunity 
costs that takes the form of cash flows- OPPORT. 
Control Variables 
In order to take account of other factors, which may have a bearing on firms’ 
propensity to TSA versus one-step technology strategies, we include several 
control variables following prior empirical research (Bayona et al., 2001; Folta 
and Miller, 2002; Colombo, 2003; López and Martín, 2008). First, the size of the 
firm is measure as the log of the firm’s annual sales-SIZE. Second, the firm’s 
age is captured by the number of years since the firm’s founding –AGE. Finally, 
we use a dummy variable –GROUP- which equals 1 if the firm belongs to a 
group of companies (i.e the firm is a parent or subsidiary company), and zero 
otherwise.  
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5. Empirical Findings  
Table 3 provides information on descriptive statistics (relative frequencies are 
provided instead of the mean for categorical variables, indicating values in 
parentheses), and Table 4 on simple correlation matrix, both of explanatory and 
control variables. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of explanatory and control variables 
 N Min. Max. Mean/% S.D. 
ACAP1 4445 0 26 0.07 0.709 
ACAP2 10308 0 500 1.56 13.192 
ACAP3 6251 0 35 0.09 0.679 
TECHRISK1 10474 0 1 6.3%(1) 29.4%(0)  
TECHRISK2 
18903 0 3 
76.2% (1) 
17.7% (2) 
6%      (3) 
 
PREEMPT1 5285 0 100 6.12 22.021 
PREEMPT2 
18752 0 3 
29.3%(1) 
56%   (2) 
14.7%(3) 
 
OPPORT1 4352 -352 12190 47.20 330.905 
SIZE 12278 0 23 15.92 2.059 
AGE 28888 0 275 25.35 21.688 
GROUP 16630 0 1 35.4%(1) 20.2%(0)  
 
 
Table 4. Simple correlation matrix of explanatory and control variables 
 
ACAP1 ACAP2 ACAP 3 TECHRISK1 TECHRISK2 PREEMPT1 PREEMPT2 
ACAP1 1       
ACAP2 0.004 1      
ACAP 3 0.628** 0.17 1     
TECHRISK1 0.082** 0.031** 0.093** 1    
TECHRISK2 0.103** 0.003 0.116** 0.85** 1   
PREEMPT1 -.014 -0.10 0.014 0.042** -0.005 1  
PREEMPT2 -0.038* -0.001 -0.013 -0.068** -0.054** -0.042** 1 
OPPORT1 -0.014 -0.007 -0.024 -0.031* -0.015 -0.026 0.026 
SIZE -0.104** 0.037* -0.100** 0.069** 0.016 -0.002 0.013 
AGE 0.105** 0.050** 0.122** 0.124** 0.056** 0.016 0.068** 
GROUP 0.060** 0 0.068** 0.053** -0.004 0.377 0.012  
 OPPORT1 SIZE AGE GROUP    
OPPORT1 1       
OPPORT2 -0.024       
SIZE 0.209** 1      
AGE -0.081** -0.047** 1     
GROUP -0.134** -0.066** 0.042** 1    
 
Results of the econometric estimates of the binomial logit models are illustrated 
in Table 5 to 7. The estimated values of the coefficients of the independent 
16 
variables, their standard errors, and the individual significant levels are 
provided. Tables also show the results of Hausman 2χ  tests. The goodness of fit 
of each model to the data is assessed by the Loglikelihood-ratio (LR) test, which 
follows a χ2 distribution and can be considered as an analogous test to F statistic 
(Aldrich and Nelson, 1989). LR test compares the fit of the null model and the 
fit of the estimated model. Thus, it tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
except the intercept are zero.  
 
Specifically, Table 5 provides information on the estimates of simple models- 
from (1) to (8)-, which are conducted just to verify the individual effects of 
explanatory variables on the probability of forming JV. The results of these 
estimates are in accordance with our theoretical arguments.  
 
Table 5. Estimates of binomial logit models (I) 
Simple Models Variable Name 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ACAP1 0.5772*** 
(0.1111) 
       
ACAP2  0.1865*** 
(0.0570) 
      
ACAP3   1.8967*** 
(0.2696) 
     
TECHRISK1    2.0503*** 
(0.2813) 
    
TECHRISK2     1.4383*** 
(0.1269) 
   
PREEMPT1      0.0082** 
(0.0038) 
  
PREEMPT2       -0.4870*** 
(0.1090) 
 
OPPORT1        -0.0608*** 
(0.0436) 
Log-likelihood  -595.73 -186.80 -580.27 -172.15 1341.11 -817.80 -205.13 -593.61 
No. Of 
Observations 
4445 531 4443 546 10474 1636 546 4352 



































Table 6 provide information on the estimates of reduced models-from (9) to 
(20). Unlike full models, reduced ones do not include control variables. Finally, 
information about the estimates of full models- from (21) to (32)- are displayed 




Table 6. Estimates of binomial logit models (II)i 
Reduced Models   









        








    











































  0.0047 
(0.1899) 






































Log-likelihood -18.09 -547.69 -492.30 -324.17 -18.97 -545.85 -43.55 -324.57 -280.59 -533.96 -480.65 -317.81 
No. of 
Observations 























































                                                 
i *** 99% confidence level, ** 95% confidence level, * 90% confidence level. 
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Table 7. Estimates of binomial logit models (III)i 
 
                                                 
i *** 99% confidence level, ** 95% confidence level , * 90% confidence level. 
Full Models   









        








    











































  0.0051 
(0.0057) 














































































































Log-likelihood -272.18 -513.35 -466.30 -306.71 -271.08 -510.34 -40.76 -305.25 -267.01 -498.10 -454.55 -299.79 
No. of 
Observations 
2141 4286 4286 2141 2120 4229 174 2120 2142 4285 4285 2142 





















































The main objective of this study is to analyse how firms decide between forming 
TSAs or adopting alternatives one-step technology strategies. In general terms, 
the findings of both sets of regressions (reduced and full models) support the 
hypotheses inspired by the ROA. The only exception is the positive coefficient 
of the variable OPPORT in models (9) and (13), contrary to what we have 
hypothesized. Notice that, for both models, Hausman test indicates the existence 
of fixed effects and, thus, the poor number of observations taken into account 
may be the reason for these contradictory results. Despite that, given the 
similarity of the results revealed by both sets of regressions, we only describe 
the findings on the basis of the full models.  
Regarding full models, the results are similar across models. However, results of 
the estimate from model (27) are contradictory to what we have hypothesized 
and to the results of the rest of the models. As in the case of models (9) and (13), 
this may be caused by the low number of observations considered by the fixed-
effects estimate. Other than that, the estimates from the full models tell a quite 
consistent story, as the signs of the coefficients are the same across models, and, 
in general terms, the same variables are statistically significant in each model 
(Wooldrige, 2002). The exception for this last condition is represented by the 
coefficient of GROUP, which remains insignificant except in models (26), (28), 
and (32). 
Detailed description of results is provided in the following. 
First, we have hypothesized that the greater the firms’ absorptive capacity the 
greater the propensity for TSA formation rather than for engaging in one-step 
technology strategies. This first hypothesis is clearly confirmed. The coefficients 
of all measures used for absorptive capacity-ACAP1, ACAP2 and ACAP3- are 
positive and significant across models. On the one hand, the results indicate the 
necessity of make systematic R&D efforts and, specially, to count on a great 
amount of technicians employees, in order to support the innovation learning 
process- see (21) to (24), and (29) to (32). On the other, as estimates (25) to (28) 
show, the positive relationship between the outcomes of these firm’s systematic 
R&D efforts (i.e. number of product innovations) and its propensity for 
engaging in TSAs is also proved, although the influence is relatively lower.  
Second, results support our argument that firms resort to technological 
collaboration as a way to maintain flexibility, thus, to protect themselves from 
technological risk. We find that firms which perceived the technological risk 
they have to face is higher -TECHRISK1 are more likely to form TSAs rather 
than engaging in other one-step technology strategies –see, for instance, (25). 
Similarly, results show that those firms which belong to industries with a higher 
technological intensity-TECHRISK2-, have a greater propensity to establish 
TSAs rather than adopting one-step strategies –see, for instance, (26). More 
specifically, the perceived degree of technological risk seems to be more 
relevant in decision-making. In sum, our second hypothesis is clearly confirmed. 
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Third, the results provide partial support for our third hypothesis that the greater 
the risk of pre-emption by rivals, the less likely is the firm to form TSA instead 
of engaging in alternative one-step technology strategies. The negative 
coefficient of the variable related to the industry lifecycle-PREEMPT2- is 
significant in each model it is considered. However, the same cannot be said 
with respect to the market concentration- PREEMPT1-, unlike what have been 
found in prior research- see (21), (24), (25), (28), (29), (32). Thus, we can just 
state that as the industry approaches latest stages of its lifecycle, the firm’s 
propensity for forming TSAs decreases, increasing the likelihood of engaging in 
other one-step technology strategies, which provide a quick-response capacity to 
the increasingly higher degree of technological rivalry. In fact, interfirm 
collaboration is more usual in the introduction and growth stages in practice, 
when the technological trajectory of the industry remains unestablished. 
Moreover, we clearly find that the greater the opportunity costs associated with 
TSA formation, the less likely is the firm to form TSA instead of engaging in 
alternative one-step technology strategies. Thus, our fourth hypothesis is also 
confirmed.  
Finally, with regard to the control variables, we find that both the firm’s size-
SIZE- and the firm’s age-AGE- affect positively the likelihood of forming 
TSAs, although the influence of the firm’s age is quite small. These positive 
relationships may be founded in the necessity of certain dimension, a wide 
profile of business contacts, and a well-established firm’s image and legitimacy 
to be able to take part in such kinds of collaborative projects like JV. The 
propensity for choosing TSAs rather than other one-step strategies, however, 
does not be specially affected by the firm’s belonging to a group of companies-
GROUP. However, when estimates show a significant coefficient for GROUP- 
see (26), (28), and (32)- the likelihood of forming a TSA rather than resorting to 
market transactions or acquisitions, is negatively affected by the firm’s 
belonging to a group of companies. 
6. Conclusion 
The main objective of the paper is to analyse how firms decide between forming 
TSAs or adopting alternatives one-step technology strategies, under real options 
logic.  
Our results provide empirical support for the four hypotheses grounded in ROA. 
Thus, we find that decision-makers implicitly follow ROA premises when 
choosing the technology strategy. Specifically, our findings show that the 
greater the firms’ absorptive capacity and the greater the technological risk the 
firm need to face, the greater the propensity for TSA formation instead of 
engaging in one-step technology strategies. Furthermore, we find that as the risk 
of pre-emption by rivals and the opportunity costs associated with TSA 
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formation increase, the less likely is the firm to form a TSA rather than adopting 
other one-step technology strategies, like arm’s length transactions or 
acquisitions.  
In sum, the contribution of the paper into the alliance formation research is 
insight into how firms decide between forming TSAs or adopting alternatives 
one-step technology strategies, on the basis on certain internal factors (the 
degree of firm’s absorptive capacity, the firm’s age, its size, and the firm’s 
belonging to a group of companies), alliance-level factors (opportunity costs 
associated with the TSA formation), and, finally, on the basis of some 
exogenous factors (the degree of technological exogenous risk that managers 
perceived the firm needs to deal with, the degree of technological intensity of 
the industry, and the thread of pre-emption by rivals). Other than this 
contribution, we expand prior ROA literature. Our paper takes a step further in 
the development of an investment theory for the field of strategic management, 
by ‘translating’ the concepts from the original OPT language to the concern of a 
particular kind of strategy: technological interfirm collaboration. 
In line with this, our paper may have also implications for management. First, 
our theoretical development may allow decision-makers to put explicitly TSA 
formation under a real options reasoning, in accordance with their necessity to 
capture the strategic value of future opportunities, taking into account the 
flexibility-commitment trade-off. In fact, the four-step option chain we have 
presented seems to reflect the observed incremental-investment behavior of 
firms operating under uncertainty. Furthermore, our research represents an 
example for how managers may be able to better evaluate comparatively the 
convenience of forming a TSA or engaging in other one-step strategies, 
depending on such internal, alliance-level, and exogenous factors. 
Our paper has also limitations. Among others, we consider the main one is that 
we analyse the likelihood of forming a particular type of TSAs: technological 
joint ventures. Further work analysing whether our model is suitable for other 
types of technological collaborative arrangements is needed. Moreover, our 
sample just provide information on manufacturing firms operating in Spain, 
without including information neither about firms belonging to high-tech 
industries (e.g. biotechnology), nor about firms belonging to the services sector 
(e.g. technology consultancy), and nor about other kind of organizations (e.g. 
research centers, universities, non-profits). Thus, a second set of future lines of 
research needs to be aimed to analyse whether results could vary when these 
other features are taken into account. 
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1. Meat 151 11. Mineral Proudcts 261, 268 
2. Foodstuffs and Tobacco 152, 158, 
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12.Metallurgic Products 
(ferrous and non-ferrous) 
271, 275 
3. Beverage 159 13. Metallic Products 281, 287 
4. Textil 171, 177, 
181, 183 
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Industrial Machinery 
291, 297 








7. Paper 211, 212 17. Motor Vehicles 341, 343 
8. Printing and Graphic Arts 221, 223 18. Other transport modes 351, 355 
9. Chemicals 251, 247 19. Furniture 361 
10.Plastic and Rubber 251, 252 20. Other Manufactures 362, 355, 
371, 372 
 
